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USURY AS A DEFENSE TO CORPORATE BONDS
SOLD BELOW PAR
As the prohibition of usury developed from a religious tenet to
a legal concept, the problem of interpreting restrictions upon
excessive exaction of interest shifted from religious leaders to
the courts. But the removal of the problem of usury from the
sphere of religion and its reallocation to the science of juris-
prudence has not lightened the task of those charged with en-
forcing and interpreting the usury laws. Just as the ecclesiastics
were troubled when the ancient laws became unjust and unsuit-
able because of changing economic conditions, so today the courts
are sometimes troubled when old usury laws fail to meet the
requirements of a more modern economy. One illustration of
the difficulties which confront modern courts is the problem of
usury as a defense to actions on corporate bonds sold below par.
Corporations sometimes issue bonds bearing the maximum
legal rate of interest and sell them below par. When a bond-
holder brings an action against the corporation for the value of
such bonds at maturity, or for interest payments, the corporation
may defend by showing that the interest rate plus the discount
rate exceeded the maximum interest charge. When this defense
prevails and the bondholder is found to have contracted usuri-
ously, he is subjected to a penalty ranging from loss of the
amount in excess of the maximum interest rate to total loss of
the value of his bonds.,
In weighing the defense advanced by the corporation, the
court is called upon to consider two issues. First, it must decide
1. Forfeiture of principal and interest: Ark. Dig. of Stats. (1937) sec.
9401; Conn. Gen. Stats. (1930) sec. 4736. Forfeiture of all interest: Ala.
Code Ann. (1928) sec. 8567; Ariz. Rev. Code (1928) see. 1884; Fla. Comp.
Gen. Laws (1927) sec. 6939; Ga. Code (1933) sec. 57-112; Idaho Code Ann.
(1932) sec. 26-1907; Ill. Smith-Hurd Ann. Stats. (1935) c. 74, sec. 6; Iowa
Code (1935) sec. 9407; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) sec. 9239; Blinn. Mason's
Stats. (1927) see. 7037; Miss. Code Ann. (1930) sec. 1946; N. T. Rev. Stats.(1937) tit. 31, see. 1-3; N. C. Code Ann. (1935) sec. 2306; N. D. Comp.
Laws (1913) sec. 6076; S. C. Code (1932) sec. 6740; S. D. Comp. Laws(1929) se. 1044; Wash. Pierce's Code (1938) sec. 3161; Wis. Stats. (1937)
sec. 115.06. Forfeiture of excess interest: Ind. Burns Stats. (1933) sec.
19-2004; Ky. Carroll's Stats. (1936) see. 2219; Md. Ann. Code (1924) art.
49, see. 4; R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 2842; N. Y. Thompson's Laws (1939) "Gen-
eral Business Law," art. 25, sec. 372; Ohio Pages Ann. Code (1926) see.
8306; Pa. Purdon's Stats. (1936) tit. 41, see. 4; Tenn. Code (1932) sec.
7315; Vt. Public Laws (1933) see. 7133; Va. Code Ann. (1936) see. 5555;
W. Va. Code (1932) sec. 4628(6). Some states impose no penalty: Colo.,
Me., Mass. (if amount is over $1000), Nev., N. H. These states have estab-
lished legal rates of interest, but no maximum rates. Other states have mis-
cellaneous provisions, such as double or treble forfeiture of interest.
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whether the transaction was usurious; and second, if there was
usury, the court must decide whether the corporation should be
permitted to avail itself of the protection afforded by the usury
statutes. Very often the second of these issues is not discussed
in the opinion even though the court, having found the bond-
holder guilty of usury, perforce had to decide it. Nevertheless,
it is not difficult to determine how the court disposed of the
matter. If judgment was for the corporation, it must have been
found that the corporation was entitled to invoke the usury laws;
if judgment was for the bondholder, the transaction must have
been non-usurious, and therefore the court was not obliged to
decide whether the corporation could invoke the usury laws. 2
These issues pertain to the meaning and intent of the usury
statutes; consequently a court must consciously or unconsciously
engage in the process of statutory interpretation before it can
supply the answers. To determine the policy implicit in the
usury statutes, a court must ask itself: (1) "Did the legislature
intend, or would it have intended, that the interest and discount
rates on corporate bonds be considered together as a single
interest charge?" and (2) "Did the legislature intend to extend
the protection of the usury laws to a corporation which sold its
bonds at a discount rate which, combined with the interest rate,
amounted to more than the maximum legal interest rate?" In
various jurisdictions and under certain circumstances, each of
these questions has been answered both affirmatively and nega-
tively. It is the purpose of this discussion to show when and why
the particular answers to these questions have been made, and
what decisions can be expected in the future.
Before indicating the several lines of decision and statutory
interpretation, it is necessary to state that there seems neither a
problem of statutory interpretation nor a conflict of decisions
when the plaintiff bondholder is not an immediate purchaser
from the corporation. In an action brought by a transferee with-
out notice, the defense of usury would probably be unavailing.3
2. If judgment was for the bondholder and the court did find the trans-
action usurious, the court would be able to arrive at its decision only by
holding that the corporation could not defend on the grounds of usury. In
that case, the court would have to discuss the issue.
3. See Fletcher & Sons v. Alpena (1904) 136 Mich. 511, 99 N. W. 748;
Weed v. Gainesville, J. & S. Ry. (1904) 119 Ga. 576, 46 S. E. 885; Tyler
County, Tex. v. Branch-Middlekauff (C. C. A. 5, 1927) 20 F. (2d) 504; 6
Fletcher, Corporations (2d ed. 1931) 626, sec. 2757.
No bond cases have been found involving the defense of usury to an
action by a transferee with notice, or transferee after maturity.
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I
In spite of contrary statements in some secondary authorities,4
the courts have generally held that, when a municipal corpora-
tion issues bonds bearing the maximum rate of interest and sells
them below par, the corporation may not defend on grounds of
usury.
The cases frequently refer to Simonton on Municipal Bonds"
as the leading authority on the subject. Section 146 reads:
That the bonds of a municipal corporation may be sold by
it for less than par must be regarded as the general under-
standing of lawmakers of the states, as well as the officers
of the municipalities, because, when it is desired to prevent
such sale, that fact is incorporated in the enabling act or in
the ordinance or resolution providing for the issue of the
bonds.
It is this section of Simonton upon which a much-quoted Oregon
case, Kiernan v. Pon'tland,7 bases its pronouncement that, "The
weight of authority is to the effect that the sale of municipal
bonds below par is not illegal, unless the act or ordinance author-
izing the issue expressly directs that they shall not be sold for
less than par.",, Washington has adopted this statement as ex-
pressing the correct rule.9 A Kansas case follows this rule, but
adds a novel consideration by saying, "bonds issued * * * which
4. "It may be laid down as a general rule of law that where a corpora-
tion, municipal or private, borrows money in return for which it issues its
bonds, the issuance thereof at a price below par makes the transaction a
usurious one, in the absence of statutory provisions legalizing such issues
by corporations or forbidding the defense of usury by such bodies." (Italics
supplied.) (1920) 27 R. C. L. 218; (1912) 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1106.
5. Rowland v. Deck (1921) 108 Kan. 440, 195 Pac. 868; Orchard v.
School-District (1883) 14 Neb. 378, 15 N. W. 730; Kornegay v. Goldsboro(1920) 180 N. C. 441, 105 S. E. 187; Kiernan v. Portland (1912) 61 Ore.
398, 122 Pac. 764, Ann. Cas. 1914B 255; Memphis v. Bethel (Tenn. 1875)
17 S. W. 191. Accord: Golden Gate Bridge and Highway Dist. v. Filmer(1933) 217 Cal. 754, 21 P. (2d) 112, 91 A. L. R. 1; O'Neill v. Yellowstone
Irr. Dist. (1912) 44 Mont. 492, 121 Pac. 283; Board of Education v. Moore(1871) 17 Minn. 412; Hattrem-Nelson & Co. v. Salmon River-Grande R. H.
Dist. (1930) 132 Ore. 297, 285 Pac. 231; Nalle v. Austin (1893) 85 Tex.
520, 22 S. W. 668; Lynchburg v. Slaughter (1880) 47 Va. 57; Yesler v.
Seattle (1890) 1 Wash. 308, 25 Pac. 1014; Paine v. Seattle (1912) 70 Wash.
294, 126 Pac. 628; Uhler v. Olympia (1915) 86 Wash. 1, 151 Pac. 117; Hill
v. Seattle (1919) 108 Wash. 572, 185 Pac. 631. Contra: Sherlock v. Win-
netka (1873) 68 Ill. 530; Danville v. Sutherlin (1871) 20 Gratt. (Va.) 555;
Lynchburg v. Norvell (1871) 20 Gratt. (Va.) 601.
6. (1896).
7. (1912) 61 Ore. 398, 122 Pac. 764, Ann. Cas. 1914B 255.
8. Kiernan v. Portland (1912) 61 Ore. 398, 122 Pac. 764, 765, Ann. Cas.
1914B 255.
9. Paine v. Seattle (1912) 70 Wash. 294, 126 Pac. 628, 127 Pac. 580;
Uhler v. Olympia (1915) 87 Wash. 1, 151 Pac. 117, 152 Pac. 998.
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earn the maximmn interest named may be sold at a discount if
the sale is made on the best terns obtainable."'1 It is difficult to
know whether this remark merely means that a fraudulent sale
will vitiate the bonds-implied, of course, in all the decisions-
or whether the court intended that there should be an investiga-
tion in each case to determine if the bonds might have been sold
at a higher price.
How were the courts interpreting the usury statutes when they
established the rule that municipal corporations may not hide
behind the statutes? The fact that courts do not hesitate to add
the nominal interest rate to the discount rate to find a single
usurious rate where bonds of private corporations are con-
cerned," indicates that the courts do not believe that the usury
statutes prohibit such computation where bonds of municipal
corporations are concerned. Rather, in holding a municipal cor-
poration fully liable on its bonds, the courts must feel that the
usury statutes were not intended to apply to bonds issued by
municipal corporations.
Considerations of policy seem to be the bases for not extending
the protection of the usury statutes to municipal corporations.
The courts, solicitous for the welfare of municipal corporations
within their states, want to insure the high standing of municipal
bonds so that subsequent issues will find a ready market. The
courts apparently believe that bonds of municipal corporations
would be impaired in the eyes of the securities-buying public if
the defense of usury were permitted. Correctly, perhaps, the
judges have realized that the legislature would never have in-
tended such a result.
2
In addition to cases that follow the rule that usury statutes do
not apply to bonds of municipal corporations, there are inappo-
site cases which have been loosely cited as substantiating the
rule.',
10. Rowland v. Deck (1921) 108 Kan. 440, 195 Pac. 868, 871.
11. See infra, page 596, part II.
12. Cf. Ex parte Washer (1927) 200 Cal. 598, 254 Pac. 951; Griffith v.
Burden (1872) 35 Iowa 138.
13. Kornegay v. Goldsboro (1920) 180 N. C. 441, 105 S. E. 187, in holding
the city's bonds free of usury, was governed by a statute which expressly
authorized the city to sell its bonds below par. Orchard v. School District(1883) 14 Neb. 378, 15 N. W. 730, also holding municipal bonds untouched
by usury, was based on a case which was not in point-Armstrong v. Free-
man (1879) 9 Neb. 11, 2 N. W. 353, which held that there was no usury
in the sale to a third person of a note and mortage for less than their
face value, where it was not a device to evade the usury laws. Griffith v.
Burden (1872) 35 Iowa 138, and Memphis v. Brown (C. C. W. D. Tenn.
1872) Fed. Cas. No. 9415, did involve municipal corporation bonds but not
the question of usury.
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Almost always a statute authorizing the issuance of bonds by
a municipal corporation also establishes the rate of interest the
bonds may bear. Ordinarily, the rate thus established does not
affect the issue of usury when bonds are sold at a discount, for
the interest restriction is generally held to refer only to the in-
terest rate appearing on the face of the bonds. 14 However, an
Illinois case-s supports the proposition that a limitation on the
interest rate of the bonds is a limitation on the nominal and dis-
count rates combined, and that the usury statutes apply to
municipal corporation bonds which are subject to such restric-
tion. In this case, bonds of the Village of Winnetka, bearing ten
per cent interest and sold at ninety-five cents on the dollar, were
held usurious because the governing statute limited the rate of
interest to ten per cent.""
II
Unlike the effect of the usury statutes on bonds of municipal
corporations, when a private corporation issues interest-bearing
bonds and sells them at a discount the usury statutes operate to
make the transaction usurious if the combined nominal interest
14. "The provision as to the amount of bonds to be issued, their denomi-
nation, and the rate of interest they shall bear has reference only to the
form of the bonds and the method in which they shall be executed, in order
to prepare them for sale." Kiernan v. Portland (1912) 61 Ore. 398, 122
Pac. 764, 765, Ann. Cas. 1914B 255. Rowland v. Deck (1921) 108 Kan. 440,
195 Pac. 868, 870, quotes this statement with approval. Note (1934) 91
A. L. R. 7.
15. Sherlock v. Winnetka (1873) 68 Ill. 530. This case might be decided
differently today under Ill. Smith-Hurd Ann. Stats. (1935) c. 74, see. 4,
which provides that a corporation may contract to pay more than the statu-
tory maximum of seven per cent.
16. Danville v. Sutherlin (1871) 20 Gratt. (Va.) 555, and Lynchburg v.
Norvell (1871) 20 Gratt. (Va.) 601, decided in Virginia a little after the
Civil War, seem in accord. However, these cases involved peculiar facts.
Municipal bonds were bought with Confederate money worth only a frac-
tion of the gold money with which they would have to be paid at maturity,
inasmuch as the conclusion of the War had made Confederate money worth-
less. In one case, the plaintiff bought a $5,000 bond bearing six per cent
interest, and maturing in twenty years, for $11,050 in Confederate money.
However, since Confederate money was worth but one-tenth the value of
gold money at the time, the purchase price really amounted to only $1105.
In the other case, the plaintiff paid $4,000 in gold ($92,000 in Confederate
money) for a bond, the total value of which would amount at maturity to$100,000 in gold. Though the language of these cases unequivocally states
that the transactions were usurious, it seems plausible to think that the
courts were influenced greatly by the enormous difference between purchase
price and maturity value and by the fact that neither purchaser nor seller
intended any such discount. These facts do not affect the issue of usury and
municipal bonds, but, as the case was presented, the only manner in which
the courts could hold the sale of the bonds invalid was by declaring them
to be usurious.
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and discount rates exceed the statutory maximum. This conclu-
sion is supported by most text-writers and annotators.1 7
A few cases support the secondary authorities. In Fletcher &
Sons Q7. Alpena," mandamus was granted at the behest of a
stockholder of the defendant corporation to compel continuance
of a preliminary injunction restraining the company from issu-
ing below par bonds bearing interest of six per cent, on the
grounds that the issue and sale would be usurious. In The
Commissioners of Craven v. The Atlantic and North Carolina
Railroad,-' the railroad company delivered to the defendants
bonds of the par value of $100,000 in payment of a $76,899.13
debt. The bonds carried the legal maximum interest of eight per
cent. The transaction was held to be usurious, because "in the
absence of special legislation corporations are embraced in the
usury laws just as natural persons are." 20 In a Michigan case,21
which seems to extend the rule to cover a sale by the maker to a
securities house, a brokerage house had contracted to buy at a
ten per cent discount the defendant corporation's six per cent
bonds, intending to sell them at a profit for its own benefit. The
court held that the facts imported a loan and that the transaction
was therefore subject to the usury laws. It should be noted,
however, that this case differs from those in which a corporation
places its bonds with a brokerage firm for the purpose of having
that firm sell the bonds to the public, without investing any of
its own capital. In such cases, a reasonable charge in the form
of a discount by the brokerage firm does not affect the validity
of the bonds. The charge is for services rendered, not for interest
on a loan.22
In suits involving bonds issued by private corporations, it
appears that the courts have interpreted usury statutes as per-
mitting the combination of nominal interest and discount rates
to attain a single usurious rate of interest, just as in cases in-
17. 6 Fletcher, Corporations (2d ed. 1931) 525, sec. 2678; Note (1912)
35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1106.
18. (1904) 136 Mich. 511, 99 N. W. 748.
19. (1877) 77 N. C. 289.
20. The Commissioners of Craven v. The Atlantic and N. C. Ry. (1877)
77 N. C. 289, 292.
21. Stirling v. Gogebic Lumber Co. (1911) 165 Mich. 498, 131 N. V. 109,
:35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1106.
22. Even where the brokerage firm underwrites a bond issue at a great
discount, the courts have held that there was no loan, and therefore no
usury. Lubbock Hotel Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. (C. C. A. 5, 1935)
77 F. (2d) 152; In re Danville Hotel Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1930) 38 F. (2d) 10;
Note (1926) 45 A. L. R. 570; Miller & Co. v. Claridge Manor Co. (D. C.
N. D. Ala. 1925) 14 F. (2d) 859. Accord: Busch v. Stromberg-Carlson Tel.
Mfg. Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1914) 217 Fed. 328.
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volving bonds of municipal corporations. But unlike the inter-
pretation given usury statutes in cases involving bonds of muni-
cipal corporations, in private corporation bond cases the courts
seem to have interpreted the statutes as allowing corporations
to defend on the ground of usury in the same manner as natural
persons.
It must be remembered, of course, that usury laws are directed
solely at the lending or forbearance of money. It has been held,
for example, that there was no usury when a railroad issued
$150,000 worth of bonds in payment for construction work val-
ued at $100,000. There had been no loan or forbearance of
money.23
Even in those cases where the court found no usury because
of special legislative enactments, there are dicta supporting the
view that bonds sold too much below par would be usurious
under the ordinary usury statutes. 24 The Supreme Court of Ohio,
in holding that under the statutes of Indiana and Ohio the cor-
poration in question might sell its bonds for less than par, said:
Independent of special statutory provisions this transac-
tion would clearly be a loan. It would be the case of a party
obtaining money upon his own promise to repay it; and,
wherever usury laws exist, when this is the case, the trans-
action necessarily imports a loan whatever form it may be
made to assume. For, if this were not so, laws prescribing
the rate of compensation for the use of money could be
evaded and nullified at the pleasure of the partiesY
It is an apparently sound interpretation of usury statutes
which permits a private corporation to defend on grounds of
usury when sued for the value of bonds by an immediate pur-
chaser from the corporation. Orthodox economists define a
bond as evidence of a loan.26 Any premium paid for the use of
money is interest, regardless of the form that interest payments
may take.2 7 There is usury if the lender receives, solely for the
23. Real Estate Trust Co. v. Wilmington & N. C. Elec. Ry. (Del. Ch.
1910) 77 Atl. 756.
24. The White Water Valley Canal Co. v. Vallette (U. S. 1858) 21 How.
414; Clearwater County State Bank v. Bagley-Ogema Tel. Co. (1911) 116
Minn. 4, 133 N. W. 91, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1132, Ann. Cas. 1913A 622; Coo
v. Columbus, P. &. I. Ry. (1859) 10 Ohio St. 372, 75 Am. Dec. 518. Cf. Mac-
Quoid v. Queens Estates (1911) 143 App. Div. 134, 127 N. Y. S. 867;
Traders' Nat. Bank v. Lawrence Mfg. Co. (1887) 96 N. C. 298, 3 S. E.
363.
25. Bank of Ashland v. Jones (1865) 16 Ohio St. 145.
26. 1 Fairchild, Furniss, Buck, Elementary Economics (1931) 103.
27. Wintergirst v. Collateral Loan Co. (1895) 60 Mo. App. 166; Krei-
bohm v. Yancey (1900) 154 Mo. 67, 55 S. W. 260; Missouri Discount Corp.
v. Mitchell (1924) 216 Mo. App. 100, 261 S. W. 743.
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use of his money, a premium above the maximum specified in
the statutes. Moreover, there is nothing to be found in the
ordinary usury statute which expressly or impliedly denies
corporations the defense of usury.2 8
III
In some jurisdictions, however, it is not true that a private
corporation may defend on grounds of usury in an action for the
value of its bonds. It is not that the courts in these jurisdictions
believe, as in the case of municipal corporations, that the usury
statutes do not apply to bonds of corporations as opposed to
obligations of natural persons. Rather, these courts feel that
usury statutes have nothing to do with the purchase and sale
of bonds.
The idea that oft-repeated dictum becomes law is well illus-
trated by what may be termed the "chattel theory" of corporate
bonds sold below par. This theory-that bonds in the hands of
the issuing corporation are chattels, rather than potential evi-
dence of loans, which may be bought and sold at any price re-
gardless of usury laws-was first squarely and unqualifiedly
presented as a basis of decision in 1929, decades after it had
been suggested. In other cases which might be thought to estab-
lish the "chattel theory," the talk about bonds as chattels might
well be considered outside the issues presented for adjudication.
But this comparatively recent case 9 flatly declares that, if the
issuer of bonds agrees with the purchaser for the sale of the
bonds, the transaction is a sale of chattels and not a loan which
can be touched by the usury statutes.
The "chattel theory" finds expression in two works of secon-
dary authority.) However, these works fail to support their
statements with adequate case material.31 Nevertheless, so
28. By "ordinary usury statute" is meant a statute which establishes
a maximum legal rate of interest and provides a penalty for interest
charges in excess of that rate.
29. Medical Arts Bldg. Co. v. Southern Finance & Development Co. (C.
C. A. 5, 1929) 29 F. (2d) 969.
30. (1885) 64 Am. Dec. 429; (1912) 39 Cyc., Usury 936. The statement
in Cyc. was deleted in Corpus Juris.
31. In the cited cases, bonds sold at excessive discount were held non-
usurious, not because they were chattels, but for other reasons. Memphis
v. Brown (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1872) Fed. Cas. No. 9415, and Griffith v.
Burden (1872) 35 Iowa 138, involved the sale of municipal bonds which
had already been negotiated. In addition, the talk about bonds as chattels
was not in reference to usury, for usury was not an issue in the case. A
New York statute, 1 N. Y. Thompson's Laws (1939) 1076, c. 20, sec. 374, de-
priving corporations of the defense of usury, governed the decision in
Gamble v. Queens County Water Co. (1890) 123 N. Y. 91, 25 N. E. 201,
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firmly and persuasively do the cited cases insist in their obiter
dicta that bonds are chattels, that an analysis of their argument
should be presented. The proponents of the "chattel theory"
concept look to historical material and modern mercantile custom
for substantiation. In this treatise on Personal Property, Brown
states:
from earliest times a bond, that is a sealed obligation, was
regarded as more than the evidence of the contract of the
parties, and considered in law to be the contract itself, so
that formerly any destruction of the paper or of the seal
destroyed the obligation itself.
2
On the other hand he points out that the early criminal law
recognized bonds as but bits of paper evidencing legal relation-
ships. There could be no larceny of bonds because they were not
property. He mentions, however, that statutes which later de-
clared theft of written documents to be larceny reconciled even
the criminal law with the civil law concept of bonds as property.
Moreover, it is common knowledge that under modern business
customs bonds are bought and sold on the open market in the
same manner as chattels. That the legal obligations contained
in a bond do not completely control its market price is also re-
garded as significant by advocates of the "chattel theory."
These arguments stand for something less than the proposition
that bonds are chattels. They attempt to utilize an axiom of
mathematics, viz., things equal to the same thing are equal to
each other, by arguing that because chattels and bonds have cer-
tain common traits and characteristics they are the same. Bonds
and chattels are not the same and no word-magic will make them
SO.
The word "chattel" (closely related to the old French "catel"
or "chatel" and to the English word "cattle") is the name of a
9 L. R. A. 527. In Traders' National Bank v. Lawrence Mfg. Co. (1887)
96 N. C. 298, 3 S. E. 363, the court withheld application of the usury laws
because the corporate charter of the issuing corporation permitted it to
borrow money on such terms as its directors might determine. In Coe v. Co-
lumbus (1859) 10 Ohio St. 372, 75 Am. Dec. 518, and Kornegay v. Golds-
boro (1920) 180 N. C. 441, 105 S. E. 187, the court pointed to a statute
legalizing the corporation's sale of bonds below par. Orchard v. School Dis-
trict (1883) 14 Neb. 378, 15 N. W. 730, was decided solely on the authority
of Armstrong v. Freeman (1879) 9 Neb. 11, 2 N. W. 353, which held that
there could be no defense of usury when the alleged usury arose from the
sale to a third person of a note and mortgage. Memphis v. Bethel (Tenn.
1875) 17 S. W. 191, although authority for the proposition that municipal
bonds are not subject to usury laws when sold at excessive discount because
they are chattels, would probably have been decided differently had the
bonds been issued by a private corporation.
32. Brown, Personal Property (1936) 13.
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concept of goods and materials valuable in themselves.3 3 There
is little material value in a document. When a chattel is de-
stroyed, nothing remains; when a bond is destroyed, the obliga-
tion represented by the document remains.34 A buyer of a chattel
exchanges something for a valuable, tangible object; a "buyer"
of a bond exchanges something for a mere promise, and if the
issuer fails to meet his obligation, the holder has lost the "pur-
chase price." Concepts can be expanded, of course, but it seems
intellectually dishonest to say, "We will stretch the concept of
chattel to include a bond, even though there are great funda-
mental differences as well as superficial similarities between the
two. Now, since a bond is a chattel, we apply the rule applicable
to chattels: Lo! the usury laws do not apply to bonds."
IV
However weak may appear the judicial process of the courts
which have advocated the "chattel theory," the resultant deci-
sions-withholding from corporations the defense of usury-
seem economically and socially sound. In fact, several states
have enacted statutes which deprive corporations of the defense
of usury.35
It is necessary to inquire into the history of the development
of the usury laws in order to evaluate the wisdom of these bond
cases which deny corporations the defense of usury and of the
statutes which deny corporations the defense of usury in all
cases. Usury laws are grounded in ideas of morality and social
policy. The Mosaic Code contains the earliest prohibition of
usury,36 and the Gospel of St. Luke also enjoins the exacting of
usury.3 7 Later, Ambrose of Milan formulated the ecclesiastic
teaching that anything accruing from capital is usury. This doc-
trine, which continued in force for nearly a thousand years, was
a symptom of a primitive economy in which loans were almost
uniformly consumer loans.3 8 Under the ethical codes of the great
33. Webster's New International Dictionary (Merriam Co. ed. 1925).
34. There may be, of course, practical difficulties of proof.
35. Del. Rev. Code (1935) sec. 3101; Ill. Smith-Hurd Ann. Stats. (1935)
c. 74, sec. 4; Iowa Code (1935) sec. 7932; Md. Ann. Code (1924) art. 49,
sec. 2; Minn. Mason's Stats. (1927) sec. 7512; Neb. Comp. Stats. (1929)
c. 74, art. 4; N. J. Rev. Stats. (1937) tit. 31, c. I, sec. 6; N. Y. Thompson's
Laws (1939) "General Business Law," art. 25, sec. 374; N. C. Code Ann.
(1935) sec. 2306; Pa. Purdon's Stats. (1936) tit. 41, sec. 2; S. C. Code
(1932) sec. 6743; S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) sec. 9652; Va. Code Ann. (1936)
sec. 5556; W. Va. Code (1932) sec. 4632; Wis. Stats. (1937) 115.06.
36. Leviticus, XXV: 36; Deuteronomy, XXIII: 20.
37. St. Luke, VI: 35.
38. 15 The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (1934) 193.
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religions, the immorality of exacting interest from a consumer
borrower is self-evident. A distressed borrower cannot bargain
for reasonable interest rates and after he has spent the money
is frequently in a worse position than before borrowing.
With the advent of economic liberalism and the Renaissance,
there began progress toward the realization that a fair return on
the use of capital was not morally bad. In 1787 Jeremy Bentham
wrote his "Defense of Usury." In the name of personal liberty
he advocated the complete freedom of trade in money which pre-
vailed in the trade of commodities.39 The trend toward the re-
laxing of usury laws continued as bans on usury were removed
by England in 1854, by Holland in 1857, by Belgium in 1865, and
by Prussia and the North German Federation in 1867. These
countries, however, soon learned that the removal of all usury
laws provoked great abuses. Like Bentham, they had failed to
distinguish between commercial or investment borrowing and
consumer or small-loan borrowing. Therefore, in the latter part
of the nineteenth century, they enacted laws, analogous to our
small-loans acts, to protect inexperienced and ignorant bor-
rowers.
Why should the lending of money be subject to arbitrary
limits when the borrower is in an adequate bargaining position?
In Massachusetts the Joint Select Committee of the Senate con-
sidered a petition for the repeal of the usury laws; in its report
of March 19, 1834, it stated:
The value of money like that of every other article, natu-
rally regulates itself. If the rate of interest upon it, as fixed
by law, coincides with the real market value, the law has no
operation whatever. If, on the other hand, the rate of
interest, as fixed by law, be lower than the market value of
money, then the effect of the law is to check the circulation
of money * * *. Thus in the only case in which it can operate
at all, the operation of the law is directly injurious. 40
The conclusion of the Committee, that the circulation of money
is impeded when the rate of interest fixed by law is lower than
the market rate as fixed by supply and demand, agreed with the
argument of the petitioners, that
Whenever the demand for money is such in the market as
to render it worth more than the established rate of interest,
the borrower, however pressing his want, however strong
his necessity, cannot raise the requisite loan; for the money
39. What Bentham did for England, Turgot did for France. Stephens,
Life of Turgot (1895) ; Leon Say, Turgot (Translation, 1888).
40. Ryan, Usury and Usury Laws (1924) 201.
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owner is not compelled to part with his money at less than
its worth; and he will not be so foolish as to lend when he
can find more profitable modes of investment.41
In addition to pointing out that the enforcement of the usury
laws causes great harm, the Committee also emphasized the fact
that usury laws are futile and cannot be satisfactorily admin-
istered. "The most general and pointed provisions that can be
devised are easily eluded by slight changes in the form of the
transaction, and the law is * * * constantly evaded." 4 2
Massachusetts again attacked the usury laws in 1861 and
abolished them entirely.43 In a notable speech to the General
Assembly, Representative Richard H. Dana, Jr., demonstrated
that usury laws do not accomplish the purposes for which they
are enacted. He stressed the fact that an artificial maximum
interest rate established by law makes no allowance for the vari-
ance in cost and risk on different loans and pointed out that,
when the interest rates are higher than the legal maximum, the
laws are invariably broken. He also stated that if the statutes
could be strictly enforced banks would receive inadequate com-
pensation for their loans and thus deprive the small depositors
of a just return on their savings.4 4 The elements of Dana's speech
are not outmoded, for modern economists such as Irving Fisher,4
T. N. Carver,40 and F. W. Taussig47 agree that the usury laws
are at best futile. John Maynard Keynes has intimated, more-
over, that usury laws help destroy the equilibrium between sav-
ings and investment. As savings vary, the laws prevent a prompt
readjustment of the interest rate.48
The fact that usury laws are mischievous and futile has gained
recognition in at least five American states where usury laws
have been abolished. 49 Fifteen states have wholly or in part de-
prived all or some corporations of the defense of usury.50 An
interesting background is furnished by a case in which a Lon-
doner had loaned $225,000 to a New York bank, the lender re-
taining about $10,000 in addition to contracting for interest of
six per cent. The New York Court of Appeals ruled that this
41. Ryan, op. cit. supra note 40, at 198.
42. Ryan, op. cit. supra note 40, at 201.
43. The usury laws had been only slightly modified in 1834.
44. Ryan, op. cit. supra note 40, at 61.
45. Elementary Principles of Economics (1913) 396.
46. See Principles of National Economy (1921) c. 38, 39.
47. See 2 Principles of Economics (1921) c. 38, 39, 40.
48. 2 Keynes, A Treatise on Money (1930) 203.
49. Colo., Me., Mass., Nev., N. H.
50. Supra, note 35.
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transaction was usurious ;51 under New York law this meant that
the borrower did not have to repay either principal or interest.
Public opinion stimulated efforts to have the New York usury
law repealed; but because of practical difficulties, the present law
prohibiting corporations from defending on the grounds of usury
was enacted as a compromise in 1850. If the statutory changes
in the other fourteen states grew out of situations and popular
sentiments similar to those in New York, then these states have
also realized the undesirability of usury laws.
If usury laws should be abolished because they are harmful
and ineffectual, then statutes denying corporations the defense
of usury are steps in the right direction. Few economists have
advocated that regulation of interest rates be eliminated in the
field of consumer, small-loan borrowing;52 but corporations are
not consumer borrowers who, because of their weak bargaining
position, need protection from sharp money-lenders. Corpora-
tions engage in commercial or investment borrowing. Nor is it a
valid criticism of statutes denying corporations the defense of
usury to say: "Why pick on corporations?" The fact that this
legislation does not go the whole way does not make it undesir-
able if it is a partial correction of the law.
In the more common usury statutes, however, there is nothing
which permits a court to withhold the defense of usury from a
corporation. The courts which have invoked the "chattel theory"
of corporate bonds have done violence to the purpose and intent
of the legislatures which enacted the statutes. In fact, these
"liberal" decisions may actually retard reform of the existing
usury laws. The law should be changed, but the process of
modification belongs to the legislatures, not the courts.
THEODORE BARON
51. The Dry Dock Bank v. American Life Ins. and Trust Co. (1850)
3 N. Y. 344.
52. Bentham, in advocating the repeal of usury laws, did not except small-
loan transactions.
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